ABSTRACT With the higher rate of using cloud storage, protecting data privacy becomes an important issue. The most effective solution is to encrypt data before uploading to the cloud. However, how to efficiently search over data encrypted with different keys is still an open problem. To address this problem, we introduce a new notion of the identity-based encryption with equality test supporting flexible authorization (IBEET-FA). It supports the test of whether two ciphertexts encrypted under the different keys encapsulate the same message, and in the meanwhile supports fine-grained authorization of the test. Based on the equality test on ciphertexts, there is a direct way to support an authorized user to search over ciphertexts of different users, which accelerates secret data sharing among a group of users. Besides, IBEET-FA does not suffer from the complex key management problem of its counterpart in the traditional public key infrastructure. We propose a concrete construction of IBEET-FA and prove it to be securely based on simple mathematical assumptions. The experimental results show that our IBEET-FA scheme is efficient and can satisfy various types of search over encrypted data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is becoming increasingly popular in recent decades [1] , [2] . Among all the cloud services, cloud storage is receiving a growing number of attention and applications [3] . The cloud service provider (CSP) provides large storage-space for users [4] . Users can outsource their data to the cloud and access the data via any network-connected device at any time, which saves local storage space and reduces data management burden. However, there are concerns about the leakage of data and user privacy. Even in a private cloud, there also are some concerns about data leakage in case of some adversary obtaining the password of the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Sedat Akleylek.
cloud manager and breaking into the cloud. Encrypting data before outsourcing is the most effective method to solve this problem. Let all data in the cloud be encrypted with different encryption keys. Even if an adversary broke into the cloud and obtained one or some decryption keys of the encrypted data, other data will be protected from leakage. Furthermore, in the real world, it is hard for an adversary to obtain these decryption keys. Unfortunately, many traditional operations on plaintexts cannot be directly applied to ciphertexts. For example, searching function over encrypted data is not available while using basic encryption schemes.
Consider the following scenario illustrated in Figure 1 . In an enterprise, there is a group of employees who are working for a secret project. To protect the business secret, data sent to the employees are encrypted and stored into a cloud. Usually, the encrypted data are encrypted with different encryption keys and may contain any kind of data, e.g. images, contract documents, videos, etc. Generally, only the one who holds the decryption key can decrypt the corresponding encrypted data. However, it obstructs data sharing among employees in the group. For example, Alice (in the group) needs files related to a specific keyword w for business purposes. It is hard to find these files from the cloud because data are encrypted with different keys. Besides, it is not easy for Alice to know who owns the files she wants to access. Hence, it is desirable to have a way to search over these ciphertexts. Furthermore, employees should have different levels of permission to search over the ciphertexts, because different employees have different authority.
Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) [5] and public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) [6] can support searching function on ciphertexts, however, they cannot feed the needs of the aforementioned scenario, as they only support the search over encrypted data of a single user. Public key encryption with equality test (PKEET) [7] is a new primitive which supports the test of whether two ciphertexts encrypted with different public keys encapsulate the same message without decryption. While anyone could do the test without permission in PKEET, it is not appropriate in the aforementioned scenario. A recent variant of PKEET called public key Encryption with equality test supporting flexible authorization (PKEET-FA) [8] , better suits the scenario above, in which ciphertexts cannot be tested without authorization. In PKEET-FA, an authorized user can check whether two ciphertexts are decrypted the same plaintext without decryption even if the two ciphertexts are encrypted with different encryption keys. Hence, it can be transformed into search progress if we set one of the two ciphertexts as a search token. Furthermore, PKEET-FA supports four types of authorization, which is more suitable for the aforementioned scenario.
However, PKEET-FA works in the traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and suffers from the complex problem of public key management. Each user has to obtain a digital certificate on its public key from a certification authority (CA) before using the key. The issue, verification, management and revocation of certificates requires much effort. IdentityBased Cryptography (IBC) was introduced by Shamir [9] to solve this problem. In IBC, there is a trusted third party called the Key Generation Center (KGC), which is in charge of generating user secret keys according to their identities. Each user can simply use its identity as the public key, for example, email address, IP address and etc, and obtain its secret key from the KGC via a secure channel. People can send an encrypted message to a user even before the user gets its secret key. Due to the advantage of IBC, it is desirable and meaningful to transfer PKEET-FA to the identity-based setting.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In order to support searching over ciphertexts encrypted with different public keys, in this paper, we introduce the notion of identity-Based encryption with equality test supporting flexible authorization (IBEET-FA), which is a variant of PKEET-FA in the identity-based setting. In IBEET-FA, ciphertexts are encrypted with the receiver's identity, and an authorized user can do the equality test on the ciphertexts. Furthermore, IBEET-FA does not suffer from complex key management as PKEET-FA.
We formally define IBEET-FA and present its security models. Roughly, IBEET-FA considers two security requirements, one-wayness and indistinguishability. The former says that if the adversary has the trapdoor, it cannot recover the message from a given ciphertext. The latter says that if the adversary is not given the trapdoor, it cannot distinguish which message the given ciphertext contains.
To demonstrate the new notion, we present a concrete construction of IBEET-FA from bilinear pairings. The construction is communicationally efficient in the sense that all the keys and trapdoors in the construction are short, each containing a small constant number of group elements. The construction is also computationally efficient, and experimental results show that its computational costs are almost the same as its counterpart in the PKI setting [8] . We prove that our IBEET-FA scheme is secure under the given models based on standard number-theoretic assumptions.
As far as we know, there is no efficient transform converting public key encryption (PKE) to identity-based encryption (IBE). It is not a trivial task to build an IBEET-FA scheme, although there is already a PKEET-FA construction in [8] . The difficulty lies in how to integrate the four types of authorization into an IBE scheme.
B. RELATED WORKS
Searchable encryption can be divided into two groups: symmetric searchable encryption [10] and public key searchable encryption [6] . The topic of this paper belongs to the latter.
The first searchable encryption scheme in public key settings (denoted by PEKS) was proposed by Boneh et al. [6] in 2004. In PEKS, people can share their private data with friends, by encrypting the data under the friend's public key. The friend can use its secret key to compute the trapdoor of a keyword, and use the trapdoor to search over the encrypted data. Since the introduction of PEKS, many variants have been proposed. For example, some works focus on fuzzy keyword search [11] - [13] , some on flexible keyword search [14] , and some on trapdoor privacy [15] - [18] . In 2010, Yang et al. [7] proposed the notion of public key encryption with equality test (PKEET), which allows a user to directly compare whether two ciphertexts have the same message. However, since anyone can do the comparison without authorization, it may leak certain private information about the data. Hence, researchers have studied how to construct fine-grained authorization mechanisms in PKEET. To name a few, Tang [19] proposed a PKEET scheme supporting authorization, in which a test server can only perform an equality test on ciphertexts encrypted with public keys of two specific users. The restriction is due to that users have to secretly share a tuple of session keys with each other during authorization. To address this issue, Tang [20] proposed another PKEET scheme called AoN-PKEET, which supports user-level authorization. In AoN-PKEET, once the test server obtains trapdoors from users, it will be able to test all the ciphertexts encrypted with these users' public keys. Ma et al. [8] proposed a PKEET scheme with flexible authorization, called PKEET-FA, which supports four types of authorization, i.e. user-level authorization, ciphertext level, user-specific ciphertext level and ciphertext-to-user level authorizations (c.f. Fig. 2 ). To improve the computational efficiency, Lin et al. [21] proposed another PKEET-FA scheme which does not use bilinear pairings. Xu et al. [22] introduced the notion of verifiable PKEET, in which a user can check whether the server performs the authorized equality test honestly or not. Canard et al. [23] introduced a new notion related to PKEET, called plaintext-checkable encryption, in which it is universally possible to check whether a given ciphertext is the encryption of a given plaintext under the key.
Ma [24] proposed the first identity-based encryption scheme supporting equality test (IBEET) which is a combination of identity-based encryption and PKEET and simplifies the complex certificate management in PKEET. However, their scheme only supports the user-level authorization, and the test server can perform the test on all ciphertexts of users who issues trapdoors to the server. To the best of our knowledge, currently, there is no IBEET scheme in the literature supporting flexible and fine-grained authorization.
We notice that the IBEET scheme in [24] does not achieve one-wayness as claimed. Roughly speaking, after obtaining trapdoor td ID t of the challenge identity ID t , the adversary re-randomizes the challenge ciphertext and submits the new ciphertext to the decryption oracle to obtain the challenge message, thus breaking the one-wayness. Hence, it is nontrivial to build a secure IBEET-FA scheme.
To support a specified group of users to perform the equality test on ciphertexts., Zhu et al. [25] and Wang et al. [26] , respectively, proposed key-policy and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption with equality test schemes.
C. ORGANIZATION
In the next section, we give a brief description of some preliminaries. In Section III we give the definition of IBEET-FA and propose an instance in Section IV. The security model and security analysis is provided in Section V. We compare our scheme with the PKEET-FA scheme [8] and present the experiment results in Section VI. The paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Bilinear pairing is a mathematics tool which plays an important role in public key cryptography [27] . It is a one-way mapping from a cyclic group G 1 to another cyclic group G T , e.g.ê : G 1 × G 1 → G T , where both G 1 and G T are groups of prime order p. It should satisfy the following properties.
• Bilinearity: For any g, h ∈ G 1 and any a, b ∈ Z p , it holds thatê(g a , h b ) =ê(g, h) a·b .
• Non-degeneracy: For any generator g ∈ G 1 ,ê(g, g)
should not be equal to the identity element of G T .
• Computability: For any g, h ∈ G 1 ,ê(g, h) can be computed in polynomial time.
B. MATHEMATICAL ASSUMPTIONS 1) BILINEAR DIFFIE-HELLMAN ASSUMPTION
Let G 1 and G T be cyclic groups with the same prime order p. Let g ∈ G 1 be a generator of G 1 andê :
, where x, y, z are randomly chosen from Z p , the Bilinear DiffieHellman (BDH) problem [28] , [29] is to computeê(g, g) xyz . The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption says that for any PPT adversary A, its advantage
is negligible in the security parameter k.
2) DECISIONAL BILINEAR DIFFIE-HELLMAN ASSUMPTION
Let G 1 , G T ,ê, p, g be as above. Given g x , g y , g z ∈ G 1 and Z ∈ G T , where x, y, z are randomly selected from Z p , the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem [28] , [29] is to decide if Z =ê(g, g) xyz or Z =ê(g, g) r for a random r ∈ Z p . The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman VOLUME 7, 2019 assumption says that for any PPT adversary A, its advantage
3) DISCRETE LOGARITHM ASSUMPTION
Let G be a cyclic group with prime order p. Let g ∈ G be a generator of G and x is a random element of Z p . Given G, p, g, g x , the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem [30] , [31] is to compute the discrete logarithm x. The Discrete Logarithm assumption says that for any PPT adversary A, its advantage
III. IBEET-FA DEFINITION
In this section we present the system model and the algorithm definitions of IBEET-FA.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
There are three parties in the system model of IBEET-FA, i.e. a KGC, a cloud, a trusted proxy and a group of users. Firstly, every user has one or more identities, e.g. email address, staff number or phone number, etc.. In one round communication, there should be two users act as a sender and a receiver, respectively. For instance, the sender encrypts a keyword utilizing the Encrypt algorithm of the IBEET-FA scheme, then uploads the ciphertext to the cloud. After that, the receiver can download and decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the encrypted keyword. In another round of communication, there may be another sender and another receiver. Using the same manner above, the new sender sends an encrypted keyword to the new receiver via the cloud. All the ciphertexts are stored in the cloud and accessible to both of the two receivers. After the two round communication, we assume the two receivers need to compare whether the keyword they received are same or not and the limitation is that the two receivers cannot expose their keywords to each other. In this case, the two can run the Aut algorithms to the proxy authorized trapdoors, thus the proxy can run the Test algorithm to check the equality of the two encrypted keywords without decryption. Note that, it directly is a searching method if one of the two trapdoors is a search token. To support different level of permission, in IBEET-FA, there are four types of authorized trapdoors and corresponding Test algorithms. Figure 2 describes the following four types of authorizations.
Type-1(User level authorization.) All ciphertexts of the user can be compared with any ciphertext of any user. Type-2(Ciphertext level authorization.) A specific ciphertext of the user can be compared with some ciphertext of any user. Type-3(User-specific ciphertext level authorization.) A specific ciphertext of the user can be compared with some ciphertext of a specific user. Type-4(Ciphertext-to-user level authorization.) A specific ciphertext of the user can be compared with any other ciphertext. It is a combination of Type-1 authorization and Type-2 authorization.
B. ALGORITHMS

Definition 1 (IBEET-FA):
An identity-based encryption with equality test supporting flexible authorization (IBEET-FA) consists of the following probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms. 1) Setup(1 k ): Given the security parameter k as input, the algorithm outputs the global parameter K. 2) KeyGen(K): Given the global parameter K as input, the algorithm outputs the master secret key msk and master public key mpk. 3) Extract(ID, msk): The algorithm takes as input a user's identity ID and the master secret key msk, and outputs the user's secret key dk ID . 4) Encrypt(M , ID, mpk): The algorithm takes as input a message M , a user's identity ID and the master public key mpk, and outputs a ciphertext C.
The algorithm takes as input a ciphertext C, a user's identity ID, its secret key dk ID and the master public key mpk, and outputs a message M or ⊥ indicating decryption failure. Type-1 (Authorization):
Given a user's identity ID i and its secret key dk ID i , the algorithm outputs a Type-1 trapdoor td (i,1) .
The algorithm takes as input two ciphertexts (C i , C j ) and two Type-1 trapdoors (td (i,1) , td (j,1) ), and outputs 1 if C i and C j contain the same message and 0 otherwise.
Type-2 Authorization:
Given a user's identity ID i , its secret key dk ID i and a ciphertext C i , the algorithm outputs a Type-2 trapdoor
The algorithm takes as input two ciphertexts (C i , C j ) and two Type-2 trapdoors (td (i,2,C i ) , td (j,2,C j ) ), and outputs 1 if C i and C j contain the same message and 0 otherwise. Type-3 Authorization:
The algorithm takes as input two users' identities (ID i , ID j ), the secret key dk ID i of user i, and two ciphertexts (C i , C j ) encrypted under ID i and ID j , respectively, and outputs a Type-3 trapdoor
The algorithm takes as input two ciphertexts (C i , C j ) and two Type-
, and outputs 1 if C i and C j contain the same message and 0 otherwise. Type-4 Authorization:
Given a user's identity ID i and and its secret key dk ID i , the algorithm outputs Type-4 trapdoors td (i,4,C i ) and td (i,4) .
The algorithm takes as input two ciphertexts (C i , C j ) and two Type-4 trapdoors (td (i,4,C i ) , td (j,4) ), and outputs 1 if C i and C j contain the same message and 0 otherwise. Remark: All the test algorithms should have the public information (e.g. master public key and identity) of i and j as input. Here we omit them for simplicity IV. OUR IBEET-FA SCHEME All the schemes make use of (symmetric) bilinear pairings. Let G 1 and G T be cyclic groups with prime order p, andê :
1 ≤ 2 ≤ n be three non-negative integers and A be a string of n bits. We denote by [A] 2 1 the substring of A which starts from the 1 -th bit and ends at the 2 -th bit.
Our construction of IBEET-FA combines the ideas of PKEET-FA [8] and IBEET [24] schemes. The secret key of each user in IBEET-FA has two parts, one for trapdoor generation and the other for decryption. Our IBEET-FA scheme works as below.
1) Setup(1 k ): Given the security parameter k, the algorithm generates bilinear pairing parameters {G 1 , G T , p, g,ê}, and chooses three cryptographic hash functions, 
Output the master secret key
and master public key
3) Extract(ID, s): Output the secret key dk ID as follows:
where
and compute the followings:
Output M if and only if all the following equations hold:
Output
holds, and 0 otherwise.
and output 1 if Eq. (1) holds, and 0 otherwise. dk ID i ,1 , C i,4 ), C i,1 , C i,2 , C i,4 ) , VOLUME 7, 2019 and compute
holds, and 0 otherwise. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first define the security models of IBEET-FA, then, based on the security model, we prove our IBEET-FA scheme is OW-ID-CCA secure against Type-I adversaries and IND-ID-CCA secure against Type-II adversaries in the random oracle model.
A. SECURITY MODELS
Same as [8] , we omit the security analysis of Type-4 authorization as it can be obtained from Type-1 and Type-2 authorizations. We take into account the following two types of adversaries.
• Type-I: The adversary A 1 with authorization tries to retrieve the message M from the ciphertext.
• Type-II: The adversary A 2 without authorization tries to distinguish to which message a given ciphertext is related. Security against Type-I adversaries is the one-wayness under chosen-identity and chosen ciphertext attacks (OW-ID-CCA), and security against Type-II adversaries is the indistinguishability under chosen-identity and chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-ID-CCA). The two security properties are defined via the following games.
Game I: Let A 1 be a Type-I adversary. Assume that the target receiver has index t (1 ≤ t ≤ n). Consider the following game played between a challenger C 1 and the adversary A 1 . 1) Setup: C 1 generates the public parameter K and master public key mpk and sends them to A 1 . 2) Phase 1: A 1 is allowed to issue the following queries for polynomially many times.
• Extract queries: Given an identity ID i , C 1 computes and returns the corresponding secret key dk ID i .
• Decryption queries: Given (ID i , C i ), C 1 decrypts C i with respect to ID i , and returns the result M i (which might be ⊥) to A 1 .
• Authorization queries: For Type-α (α = 1, 2, 3) authorization: Game II: Let A 2 be a Type-II adversary. Assume that the target receiver has index t (1 ≤ t ≤ n). Consider the following game played between a challenger C 2 and the adversary A 2 . 1) Setup: C 2 generates the public parameter K and master public key mpk, and sends them to A 2 . 2) Phase 1: A 2 is allowed to issue queries for polynomially many times as in Game I. 3) Challenge: A 2 submits two equal-length messages M 0 , M 1 and a target identity ID t , with the constraint that ID t did not appear in extract queries nor Type-1 authorization queries. C 2 then randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes C * ← Encrypt(M b , ID t , mpk). It returns C * to the adversary. 4) Phase 2: A 2 continues to issuing queries as in Phase 1, with the following constraints:
• (ID t , C * ) did not appear in decryption queries, • ID t did not appear in extract queries nor Type-1 authorization queries, and (ID t , C * ) did not appear in the authorization queries. Remark: If an IBEET-FA scheme is IND-ID-CCA secure, no PPT adversary can generate a valid Type-3 trapdoor of an unauthorized ciphertext with non-negligible probability. Suppose that A is an adversary who can generate a valid Type-3 trapdoor of an unauthorized ciphertext. We can use it to build another algorithm A 2 to break IND-ID-CCA security with non-negligible advantage as follows: 1) A 2 randomly chooses an identity ID and issues an authorization query to obtain Type-1 trapdoor of ID . 2) A 2 produces a ciphertext C of M 0 under ID . 3) Given the challenge ciphertext C * , A 2 runs A to generate a Type-3 trapdoor with respect to C * and C . Then it runs the test algorithm to check whether C * and C contain the same message, and determines the bit b . Similarly, there is no PPT adversary which is able to produce a valid Type-2 or Type-1 trapdoor of an unauthorized ciphertext with non-negligible probability.
B. OW-ID-CCA SECURITY
Theorem 1 (OW-ID-CCA):
Our IBEET-FA scheme above is OW-ID-CCA secure against Type-I adversaries in the random oracle model if BDH assumption holds.
Proof: Let A be a Type-I adversary against the OW-ID-CCA security of our IBEET-FA scheme, and C be the challenger. Consider the following games. Below S i (i = 1, 2, 3) denotes the the event that the adversary wins in Game i.
Game 1: This is the original Type-I game. 1) Setup: In this phase, the challenger C generates the global parameter K, the master public key Y , and the master secret key s as follows:
The challenger makes K and Y public. 2) Phase 1: The adversary A is allowed to issue queries to the following oracles.
• 
-O H 2 : The oracle maintains a list L H 2 = {(T , H 2 (T ))} which is initially empty. Given an input T i , it randomly selects a string R ∈ {0, 1} 2 1 , returns H 2 (T i ) = R to A, and stores
The oracle maintains a list L H 3 = {(T , H 3 (T ))} which is initially empty. Given an input T i , it randomly selects a string R ∈ {0, 1} 2 2 , returns H 3 (T i ) = R to A, and stores
• Extract Oracle: Given an identity ID i , the oracle runs the hash oracle O H 1 to get the hash value H 1 (ID i ) and runs the Extract(ID i , s) algorithm to generate the decryption key
It returns dk ID i to A.
• Decrypt Oracle: Given an identity ID i and 
as below, and returns C * to the adversary: 
Game 2: It is the same as Game 1, except that the challenge ciphertext C * is computed as follows:
The only difference is that we now use a random W 1 to replace The proof is given later (on page 25416). Game 3: It is the same as Game 2 except that C * 5 in the challenge ciphertext is replaced with a random string of length 2 2 .
Notice that in Game 2, C * 5 is the exclusive OR of M r 1 with a random string, and thus it is also random. Therefore, the adversary's view in Game 3 is identical to that in Game 2, and we have that
Lemma 2: Pr[S 3 ] is negligible if BDH assumption holds.
The proof is given later (on page 25417). Combining Lemma 1 and 2 and Eqs. (3) and (4), we have that
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 1: Assuming that event E 1 happens with probability E 1 in Game 1 (page 25415). We build an algorithm B to solve the BDH problem.
Given
, where x 1 , x 2 , x 3 are random elements of Z p , algorithm B randomly chooses s 1 ← Z p , and sets
and keeps s 1 secretly. Notice that the second component of msk is s 2 = x 1 , which is unknown to B. It randomly chooses t * ← {1, · · · , p} as its guess of the index of the challenge identity chosen by the adversary. B then gives the system parameter and mpk to the adversary, and answers its queries as below.
1) Phase 1: The adversary A is allowed to issue queries to the following oracles.
• O H 1 : If the input identity ID i is the t * -th query, B sets h i = ⊥ and returns
Otherwise, it randomly chooses h i ← Z p and returns H 1 (ID i ) = g h i . In either case, B stores (ID i , h i , H 1 (ID i )) into the list L H 1 (which is initially empty).
• O H 2 : Same with that in Game 2 (page 25415).
• O H 3 : Same with that in Game 2 (page 25415).
2 ). B returns dk ID i to the adversary.
• Decrypt Oracle O D : Given an identity ID i and
is not the t * -th query to O H 1 , B runs the Extract Oracle O E to obtain the corresponding secret key dk ID i , and returns the decryption result
. It stops traversing if all equations below hold:
there is no such an M , B returns ⊥.
• Trapdoor Oracle O T : Same with that in Game 2 (page 25415). 2) Challenge: At some point, the adversary A submits a challenge identity ID t . If ID t is not the t * -th query to O H 1 , B aborts the game; otherwise, B randomly selects a message M t and computes the challenge ciphertext
as below, and returns C * to the adversary:
where r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ∈ Z 3 p are random. 3) Phase 2: The adversary continues to issuing queries as in Phase 1. The constraints are that the challenge identity ID t did not appear in Extract queries, and (ID t , C * ) did not appear in Decrypt queries. 4) Guess: Finally, A outputs a plaintext M t , and wins the game if M t = M t . Notice that if B's guess of t * is correct, i.e. ID t * is chosen by the adversary as the challenge identity, the view of the adversary is identical to that in a real attack. Denote by abt the event that B aborts. Due to the random choice of t * , we have that Pr[abt] ≥ 1/q H 1 .
Conditioned on that B does not abort, if A did not query O H 3 with input (ê (H 1 (ID 
, the corresponding hash value is random to A. Besides, C * 5 is also random. Therefore, the challenge ciphertext hides the message M t perfectly, and the probability that the adversary finds the correct M t is negligible. Hence, with overwhelming probability A queried O H 3 with input 25416 VOLUME 7, 2019 e(g, g) x 1 x 2 x 3 . B randomly picks a tuple (T , H 3 (T )) from the list L H 3 , where T = (T 1 , · · · , T 5 ), and outputs T 1 . The probability that the output of B is the solution to the given BDH problem instance is at least E 1 /q H 1 q H 3 −negl(k). If E 1 is non-negligible, so is B's advantage in breaking the BDH assumption. Therefore, the event E 1 happens with negligible probability.
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2:
If Pr[S 3 ] in Game 3 (page 25416) is non-negligible, we can build an algorithm B to solve the BDH problem. Given (G 1 , G T , p,ê, g, g 1 = g x 1 , g 2 = g x 2 , g 3 =  g x 3 ) , where x 1 , x 2 , x 3 are random elements of Z p , algorithm B randomly chooses a number s 2 ← Z p , and sets
and keeps s 2 secretly. Notice that the first component of msk is s 1 = x 1 , which is unknown to B. It randomly chooses t * ← {1, · · · , p} as its guess of the index of the challenge identity chosen by the adversary. B then gives the system parameter and mpk to the adversary, and answers its queries as below.
1) Phase 1: Same as that in the proof of Lemma 1.
2) Challenge: At some point, the adversary A submits a challenge identity ID t . If ID t is not the t * -th query to O H 1 , B aborts the game; otherwise, B randomly selects a message M t and computes the challenge ciphertext
the corresponding hash value is totally random to A. Therefore the challenge ciphertext hides the message M t perfectly, and A has negligible probability to find M t . Thus, with overwhelming probability A issues a query to O H 2 on input (ê(g, g) x 1 x 2 x 3 , · · · ), B randomly picks a tuple (T , H 2 (T )) from the list L H 2 , where T = (T 1 , · · · , T 4 ). The probability that T 1 is the solution of the given BDH instance will be at least Pr [S 3 Let (G 1 , G T , p,ê, g ) be bilinear pairing parameters as described in the scheme, and let C DBDH be the challenger of DBDH problem.
Given (g, g x 1 , g x 2 , g x 3 , Z ) where Z is either equal tô e(g, g) x 1 x 2 x 3 (i.e. b = 0) or a random element of G T (i.e. b = 1), B randomly selects s 1 ← Z p and sets the master public key mpk = Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 ) = (g x 1 ·s 1 , g x 1 ) . Suppose that the adversary A 2 issues at most q H 1 , q H 2 , q H 3 queries to hash oracles O H 1 , O H 2 , O H 3 , respectively. B chooses at random t * ← {1, · · · , q H 1 } (as a guess of which identity would be chosen as the challenge identity by the adversary), and gives the system public parameters and mpk to the adversary A 2 , and answers A 2 's queries as below. 1) Phase 1: A 2 is allowed to issue the following oracles. Again, we assume that the adversary does not repeat a query to the same oracle.
• Hash Oracles: 
and returns dk ID i .
• Decryption Oracle: Given an identity ID i and a ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 , C 5 ), B runs the following algorithm and gets the result = M T or ⊥. B returns M or ⊥. T will be used by the trapdoor oracle.
8:
return result 12: end if 13: end for 14: end if 15 : end for 16 : return result
Otherwise, B runs the decryption oracle O D to get the value result.
where If Z is a random element of G T , i.e. b = 1, all components of the challenge ciphertext are random and reveal nothing about the bitb, thus the adversary wins the game only with probability at most 1/2. So we have that
Therefore, we have that 
VI. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
In this section we analyze the efficiency of our IBEET-FA scheme, and compare the scheme with some related works, e.g. the PKEET-FA scheme [8] , VPKEET [22] and the IBEET scheme [24] , in terms of security, communicational complexity and computational complexity. Table 1 shows that our scheme has a comparable communicational complexity and the same level of security with PKEET-FA and IBEET. Table 2 shows that the computational costs of our scheme are comparable with PKEET-FA and IBEET schemes. In the tables we use |G 1 |, |G T | and |Z p | to denote the bit length of an element in G 1 , G T and Z p , respectively, and use Pairing and Exp to denote the computational cost of evaluating a bilinear pairing and a modular exponentiation, respectively.
Due to the functional similarity, we implemented our scheme and PKEET-FA scheme in order to do a detailed comparison. The experiment platform is a VMware [32] virtual machine (VMware Workstation 12 Pro v12.1.1), with a two-core CPU and 4 GB memory and running Ubuntu 16.04 32-bit. The host machine has a quad-core 3.40GHz Intel i7-6700 CPU and 8 GB memory, and runs Windows 7 professional. We used the Type-A pairing in PBC library [33] to implement the schemes. The elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + x over the field F p with prime p ≡ 3 mod 4 [33] was used in the experiment, and the prime p is p = A7A73868E95FBA886EDEF8CE96E7217E364BB 946F5ED839628D1F80010940622A7AFDAF9B049
744A459E54DAB7BA5BE92539E8FF9B4F30A3C
F6230C28E284D97. Figure 3 shows that the computational costs of Encrypt and Decrypt algorithms of our IBEET-FA scheme are slightly higher than but still comparable with those of PKEET-FA scheme [8] . Figure 4 shows the computational costs of authorization algorithms of the two schemes. The running time of Type-2 and Type-3 authorization algorithms of the two schemes increase linearly with the repetition numbers. The running time of Aut 1 is constant. Although our Aut 2 algorithm has a slightly lower efficiency than that of PKEET-FA, our Aut 3 algorithm is more efficient. Figure 5 shows the computational costs of test algorithms. Our Test 1 algorithm is slightly slower than that of VOLUME 7, 2019 PKEET-FA, but the other test algorithms of our scheme are almost as efficient as those of PKEET-FA. Generally, our IBEET-FA scheme has almost the same computational efficiency with PKEET-FA scheme [8] .
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we introduced a new notion of identity-based encryption, called IBEET-FA, which supports flexible and authorized equality test on ciphertexts. The notion can be applied to search over ciphertexts encrypted with different public keys in IBE settings. We gave the security models of IBEET-FA and proposed a concrete construction, which was proved to be secure under the given model based on standard mathematical assumptions. Compared with its counterpart in the PKI setting, our scheme has almost the same efficiency and furthermore does not suffer from the complex key management issue.
Our IBEET-FA scheme is based on bilinear pairing, which is still computationally expensive. In future work, we consider constructing IBEET-FA schemes without using bilinear pairing. 
